Week 13: Algorithmic Manipulation
April 4, 2022
A Lack of Control
Impacting Real World Outcomes: The Positive Side
Defining “fake news”
Sources of misinformation/disinformation

- Rumors and fiction
- Governments and politicians
- Vested interests
- The media

Lewandowsky et al 2012
The societal costs of misinformation
Examining the Alternative Media Ecosystem Through the Production of Alternative Narratives of Mass Shooting Events on Twitter
domains that had cont
Right, U.S. Alt
ple (Illum
erable material referencing various anti
and elsewher
stream media. Though few d
the corporate
many alternative media websites, which claim to challenge
globalist sentiment echoes within
activistpost.com
dcclothesline.com
nytimes.com

66 of 80
tweets, accounts, and stance towards an alternative narr
native media or blogs.

he InfoWars
alternative media domains.

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(Figure 2)
shows the domain network graph
to promote these theories, while mainstream.

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Renewed interest
Fake news on Twitter during the 2016 U.S. presidential election

Nir Grinberg¹,², Kenneth Joseph², Lisa Friedland², Briony Swire-Thompson¹,², David Lazer¹,²†

The spread of fake news on social media became a public concern in the United States after the 2016 presidential election. We examined exposure to and sharing of fake news by registered voters on Twitter and found that engagement with fake news sources was extremely concentrated. Only 1% of individuals accounted for 80% of fake news source exposures, and 0.1% accounted for nearly 80% of fake news sources shared. Individuals most likely to engage with fake news sources were conservative leaning, older, and highly engaged with political news. A cluster of fake news sources shared overlapping audiences on the extreme right, but for people across the political spectrum, most political news exposure still came from mainstream media outlets.

In 1925, Harper’s Magazine published an article titled “Fake news and the public,” decrying the ways in which emerging technologies had made it increasingly difficult to separate rumor from fact (7). Nearly a century later, fake news has again found its way social media have described its spread within platforms (5, 6) and highlighted the disproportionate role played by automated accounts (7), but they have been unable to make inferences about the experiences of ordinary citizens.

Outside of social media, fake news has been

We distinguished among three classes of fake news sources to allow comparisons of different operational definitions of fake news. The three classes correspond to differences in methods of generating lists of sources as well as perceived differences in the sites’ likelihoods of publishing misinformation. We labeled as “black” a set of websites taken from preexisting lists of fake news sources constructed by fact-checkers, journalists, and academics (8, 9) who identified sites that published almost exclusively fabricated stories [see supplementary materials (SM) section S.5 for details]. To measure fake news more comprehensively, we labeled additional websites as “red” or “orange” via a manual annotation process of sites identified by Snopes.com as sources of questionable claims. Sites with a red label (e.g., Infowars.com) spread falsehoods that clearly reflected a flawed editorial process, and sites with an orange label represented cases where annotators were less certain that the falsehoods stemmed from a systematically flawed process. There were 171 black, 64 red, and 65 orange fake news sources appearing at least once in our data.

Voters on Twitter
To focus on the experiences of real people on Twitter, we linked a sample of U.S. voter reg-
The spread of true and false news online
Media’s Next Challenge: Overcoming the Threat of Fake News

Jim Rutenberg
MEDIATOR NOV. 6, 2016
The impact of social media “fake news”...
The challenges of bots
Social bots distort the 2016 U.S. Presidential election online discussion
by Alessandro Bessi and Emilio Ferrara

Abstract
Social media have been extensively praised for increasing democratic discussion on social issues related to policy and politics. However, what happens when this powerful communication tools are exploited to manipulate online discussion, to change the public perception of political entities, or even to try affecting the outcome of political elections? In this study we investigated how the presence of social media bots, algorithmically driven entities that on the surface appear as legitimate users, can affect political discussion around the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. By leveraging state-of-the-art social bot detection algorithms, we uncovered a large fraction of user population that may not be human, accounting for a significant portion of generated content (about one-fifth of the entire conversation). We inferred political partisanship from hashtag adoption, for both humans and bots, and studied spatio-temporal communication, political support dynamics, and influence mechanisms by examining the level of network embeddedness of the bots. Our findings suggest that the presence of social media bots can indeed negatively affect democratic political discussion rather than improving it, which in turn can potentially alter public opinion and endanger the integrity of the Presidential election.

Contents
Introduction
Methodology
Data analysis
Conclusions

Introduction
Various computational social science studies demonstrated that social media have been extensively used to foster democratic conversation about social and political issues: From the Arab Spring (González-Bállon et al., 2011; Howard et al., 2011), to Occupy Wall Street (Conover et al., 2013a; Conover et al., 2013b) and many other civil protests (Varol et al., 2014; González-Bállon et al., 2013) (Bastos et al., 2014), Twitter and other social media seemed to play an instrumental role to involve the public in political conversations, by collectively framing the narratives related to particular social issues, and coordinating online and offline activities. The use of digital media to discuss politics during election times has also been the subject of various studies, covering the last four U.S. Presidential elections (Adamie and Glance, 2005; Diakopoulos and Shamma, 2010; Bekkioui and McIvor, 2011; Carlisle and Patton, 2013; D’Ingrazi et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016), and other countries like Australia (Gibson and McAllister, 2006; Burns and Burgess, 2011; Burgess and Burns, 2012), and Norway (Enn and Skogber, 2013). Findings that focused on the positive effects of social media such as increasing voting turnout (Bond et al., 2012) or exposure to diverse political views (Bakshy et al., 2015) contributed to the general praise of these platforms as a tool to foster democracy and civil political engagement (Shirky, 2008; Loader and Mocan, 2011; Elling et al., 2011; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012).

However, as early as 2006, Philip Howard raised concerns regarding the possibility of manipulating public opinion and spreading political misinformation through social media (Howard, 2006). These issues have been later proven true by several studies (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011a; Ratkiewicz et al., 2011b; Metaxas and Mustafaraj, 2012) (El-Khalil, 2013; Ferrara, 2015; Woolley and Howard, 2016; Sherry and Howard, 2016). Of particular concern is the fact social media have been demonstrated effective in influencing individuals (Aral and Walker, 2009). One way to perform such type of manipulation is by using social bots, algorithmically controlled accounts that emulate the activity of human users but operate at much higher pace (e.g., automatically producing content or engaging in social interactions), while successfully keeping their artificial identity undisclosed (Hwang et al., 2012; Messias et al., 2013; Ferrara, 2016).

Evidence of bot activity in social media platforms started to appear in 2011. The 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests were the first large-scale political movement in the United States to be heavily influenced by bots, with a substantial number of tweets appearing to be generated by dolls, stuffed animals, and even inanimate objects (Kollanyi et al., 2016). Governments, organizations, and other entities with sufficient resources, can obtain the technological capabilities to deploy thousands of social bots and use them to their advantage, either to support or to attack particular political figures or candidates. Indeed, it has become increasingly simpler to deploy social bots, so that, in some cases, no coding skills are required to setup accounts that perform simple automated activities: Tweet bots often post tutorials and ready-to-use tools for this purpose [1], [2], [3]. Various source codes for sophisticated social media bots can be found online as well, ready to be customized and optimized by the more technical savvy users (Kollanyi, 2016). We inspected several of these readily available bots and this is a (non-comprehensive) list of the capabilities that they provide: Search Twitter for phrases/hashtags/keywords and automatically tweet them; Automatically reply to tweets that meet a certain criteria; automatically follow any users that tweet something with a specific phrase/hastag/keyword; Automatically follow back any users that have followed the bot; Automatically follow any users that follow a specified user; Automatically add users tweeting about something to public lists; Search Google (and other engines) for articles/news according to specific criteria and post them, or link them in automatic replies to other users; Automatically aggregating public sentiment on certain topics of discussion; Buffer and post tweets automatically. Most of these bots can run in cloud services or infrastructures like Amazon Web Services (AWS) or Heroku, making it more difficult to block them. Finally, a very recent trend is that of providing Bot-As-A-Service (BaaS): companies like RoboLike (https://robo.like.com/) provide "Easy-to-use Instagram/Twitter auto bots" performing certain automatic activities for a monthly price. Advanced conversational bots powered by more sophisticated Artificial Intelligences are provided by companies like ChatBots.to that allow anyone to "Add a bot to services like Twitter, Hubot, Facebook, Skype, Twilio, and more" (https://developer.pandorabots.com/).
Connectivity

First Evidence That Social Bots Play a Major Role in Spreading Fake News

Automated accounts are being programmed to spread fake news, according to the first systematic study of the way online misinformation spreads

by Emerging Technology from the arXiv August 7, 2017

Fake news and the way it spreads on social media is emerging as one of the great threats to modern society. In recent times, fake news has been used to manipulate stock markets, make people choose dangerous health-care options, and manipulate elections, including last year’s presidential election in the U.S.

Clearly, there is an urgent need for a way to limit the diffusion of fake news. And that raises an important question: how does fake news
Zuckerberg tells Congress Facebook is not a media company: ‘I consider us to be a technology company’
Sites by partisan attention (Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, Hal Roberts, and Ethan Zuckerman)
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg admitted on Wednesday that he was wrong to dismiss the idea that fake news shared on the giant social network affected last year's presidential election.

Zuckerberg's statement came in response to a tweeted attack from President Donald Trump hours earlier. Trump claimed that Facebook was "always anti-Trump" and accused it of colluding with news outlets that the president has deemed to be "fake news."
Facebook targets 'false news' amid growing pressure from advertisers

By Marianna Spring
Specialist disinformation and social media reporter

30 June 2020

Facebook's new media literacy campaign will ask users questions about what they see online
Deplatforming Trump Is Already Having a Huge Impact

A new report finds election misinformation online has fallen 73 percent since the president’s ban from Twitter.
Working to Stop Misinformation and False News

We know people want to see accurate information on Facebook – and so do we.

False news is harmful to our community, it makes the world less informed, and it erodes trust. It's not a new phenomenon, and all of us — tech companies, media companies, newsrooms, teachers — have a responsibility to do our part in addressing it. At Facebook, we're working to fight the spread of false news in three key areas:

• disrupting economic incentives because most false news is financially motivated;

• building new products to curb the spread of false news; and

• helping people make more informed decisions when they encounter false news.
Anti-social network

In Myanmar, Facebook struggles with a deluge of disinformation

Weeks before an election, Burmese social media are awash with fake news and vitriol
So social media sites are starting to label fake news or take down posts. Is this enough? What else can be done to stop the spread of fake news?